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How Can Competitiveness be Achieved in post-Crisis Europe: 
Deregulating Employment Relations or Enhancing High Performance 
Work Practices? 
Abstract: The recent Eurozone crisis has reinvigorated neoliberal policies and 
brought to the fore an academic and policy debate over the deregulation of 
employment relations’ institutions ‘in the name of competitiveness’. In the context 
of this debate, we ask the following question: have firms with employment 
relations institutions been less able to improve productivity during the crisis? We 
consider this question by examining data from the European Company Survey. We 
also look into different models of capitalism to gauge whether there are context-
specific institutional effects that may mediate firm-level outcomes. Contrary to the 
dominant neoliberal discourse, we do not find any strong evidence that 
employment relations institutions are negatively associated with productivity 
increases. Instead, we find that certain high performance work practices are 
positively and significantly associated with productivity increases across EU-15 
and in particular institutional contexts. Taken together these results challenge the 
neoliberal ‘low road’ policies that are focused on dismantling employment 
relations institutions and suggest shifting the attention towards context-sensitive 
‘high road’ policies and practices. 
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Introduction 
There is surprising consensus among scholars and commentators that the recent 
crisis has been ‘the greatest crisis of capitalism most of us have seen in our 
lifetime’ (Morgan et al., 2011: 150). Scholars are puzzled by how quickly the US 
Wall Street collapse mutated into a Eurozone state debt crisis, thus, shifting the 
discourse of blame from irresponsible financialization, onto state’s excessive 
borrowing and reckless spending. With the exception of a short period that the 
debate was focused on containing unfettered markets, neoliberalism has come 
back with vengeance (Crouch, 2011; Heyes et al., 2012). 
Despite the subtle differences among variants of neoliberalism (Crouch, 
2011), neoliberal ideas typically blame employment relations (henceforth: ER) 
institutions, such as representative unions and collective bargaining, for 
worsening competitiveness. Therefore, flexibility and deregulation are 
promulgated as the best recipe for competitiveness in many European countries 
and at the European Union (EU) level (Hyman, 2001: 289; Monastiriotis, 2005). 
However, the evidence-base for these claims is rather weak and inconclusive 
(ITUC, 2013). To contribute to this debate, we set out to ask the following 
question: have firms with ER institutions been less able to improve productivity 
during the crisis? 
To address this question we develop and examine hypotheses that hold ER 
institutions as responsible for deteriorating productivity. Additionally, we 
develop alternative hypotheses that look at the relationship between high 
3 
 
performance work practices and productivity. Methodologically, the paper 
analyses data from the European Company Survey (ECS) 2009, a pan-European 
establishment-level survey. The ECS dataset is most suitable for our analysis for 
several reasons: (1) the dataset was collected in 2009, which was the year with 
the deepest slump for most European economies, and this gives us valuable 
insights for the relationships in the context of the economic crisis; (2) it is a very 
rich dataset with information on a wide range of relevant ER institutions and work 
practices, i.e. suitable for the questions we ask and also offers further information 
that allows to control for other effects; (3) it is suitable for comparative research 
because it uses a questionnaire developed by expert methodologists, which is 
standardized across European countries; (4) it contains several thousand 
observations from different industry and country contexts, thus, allowing for more 
generalizable conclusions.  
We focus on the EU-15 countries 1  and we examine research hypotheses 
using ordered-probit regression analysis. The aim is twofold. First, we aim to 
consider the relationship between ER institutions and work practices with 
productivity using the EU-15 as a relatively homogeneous sample. Second, we aim 
to explore the same hypotheses across clusters of capitalism, so as to gauge 
whether there are any context-specific institutional effects that may mediate firm-
level outcomes. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The second section sets the 
scene by discussing the link between deregulation and the aim of improving firm 
4 
 
competitiveness at the EU level and the manifestation of neoliberal policies across 
models of European capitalism. The third section develops hypotheses on the 
basis of neoliberal arguments about the relationship between ER institutions and 
productivity. Additionally, it develops alternative hypotheses on the relation 
between work practices and productivity drawing on the High Performance Work 
Systems (HPWS) literature. The fourth section presents the dataset and outlines 
the methodology of the study. The fifth section presents and discusses the findings 
of our statistical analysis. The final section summarises the key findings of this 
article, acknowledges the limitations of this analysis and considers implications 
for policy and practice. 
Competitiveness in Europe: Intensifying deregulation across 
European models of capitalism 
Ever since the Lisbon Agenda, the pursuit of competitiveness has been a central 
part of the EU priorities and policies. This aim was reiterated in the Commission’s 
Europe 2020 strategy, where competitiveness ‘through higher productivity’ 
formed one of the pillars for the achievement of smart, sustainable and inclusive 
growth (European Commission, 2010: 12). The main employment-related policies 
to achieve this target concern the increase in flexibility in the labour market. 
Despite the lack of any conclusive empirical evidence on the positive effects of 
deregulation or the negative effects of ER institutions on productivity (Marginson, 
2015; Vergeer and Kleinknecht, 2014), the EU promoted a programme of labour 
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market deregulation in which ‘the central aim was reworking the precise mix of 
labour market policies and institutions to best reconcile economic 
competitiveness and social solidarity’ (Clasen et al., 2012: 5). It was assumed that 
a more flexible ER framework would allow the adjustment of labour supply to the 
needs of the employers by reducing their auxiliary costs (e.g. redundancy costs) 
and improving response to market changes. The EU aimed to facilitate the increase 
in flexibility by issuing Country Specific Recommendations (CSRs) to each 
member-state, and required the reform of national collective bargaining systems 
in order to improve competitiveness (Clauwaert, 2014).  
Interestingly, the advent of the 2009 economic crisis significantly 
accelerated the implementation of neoliberal policies in Europe. This makes this 
exploration even more relevant and timely, since some Southern European 
countries –such as Greece and Portugal– were obliged to abruptly deregulate their 
ER systems to improve competitiveness (Kornelakis and Voskeritsian, 2014; 
Molina, 2014). The main aims of the bailout packages were to ‘expose workers to 
the full force of global labour market competition, requiring [countries] to 
compete in low prices alone…’ (Crouch, 2014: 13). Other Southern countries, 
which were not subject to strict conditionality programmes –such as Italy, Spain 
and very recently France– deregulated their ER institutions for the same reason 
(Clauwaert, 2014; Molina, 2014). In sum, the Eurozone crisis intensified the 
deregulation of ER institutions across models of capitalism ‘in the name of 
competitiveness’. 
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Although the process of deregulation and marketization (Crouch, 2014) is 
being more explicitly promoted by the EU in recent years, it is by no means new. 
The trend towards deregulation of ER institutions is observed in a number of 
European countries; however, the pace of deregulation has been variable across 
different models of capitalism. While there is no universal agreement on the 
clustering of countries, several scholars tend to agree that there exist four distinct 
models of capitalism in Europe: the Liberal Market Economies/Anglo-Saxon 
capitalism, the Coordinated/Continental European capitalism, the Nordic Model of 
capitalism and the Southern European Model of capitalism (Amable, 2003; Becker, 
2009; Hyman, 2004). This clustering is theoretically strong and empirically 
robust. Theoretically it is grounded in the different historical constellations of 
power relations between capital, state and labour (Becker, 2009), as well as based 
on variable degrees of decommodification of labour (Hyman, 2004). Empirically, 
it has been verified by the work of Bruno Amable (2003), who used cluster 
analysis to come up with this classification drawing on a very rich dataset of 
indicators that comprise the different institutional arrangements in the labour 
market, welfare regime, product market and corporate governance. 
The clustering of countries has important implications for the analysis. To 
begin with, it provides the opportunity to gauge whether there are any context-
specific effects that may alter the relationship between ER institutions and 
competitiveness. One of the key insights of the models of capitalism literature is 
that ER institutions may provide ‘institutional complementarities’ (Hall and 
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Soskice, 2001: 21) and together with other institutions may reinforce positive 
feedback effects, which would increase firm competitiveness. Hence, the 
relationship between ER institutions and firm competitiveness may vary across 
clusters, as countries find themselves at different stages of labour market 
(de)regulation. Indeed, since the late 1970s, the revival of neo-liberal policies in 
Britain paved the way for the deregulation of its ER framework (Crouch, 2011; 
Heyes et al., 2012). In the British case, the deregulation of the labour market was 
part of a government programme forcing marketization and financialization in 
every part of the economy. Overall, the Liberal Market economies, notably the UK 
and Ireland, have already made important steps towards greater flexibility in their 
labour markets. The implication of this trajectory for our analysis may be that 
since ER institutions have become very weak, their hypothesised negative effects 
on productivity may have diminished. 
For this reason the analysis shall also proceed to examine the relationship 
between ER institutions and productivity change in other clusters of countries. In 
Continental European capitalist countries, such as Germany, it was the employers 
who contributed to the incremental erosion of the coordinated industrial relations 
regime (Gumbrell-McGormick and Hyman, 2013; Hassel, 2014). Despite the fact 
that Continental European governments adopted policies facilitating labour 
market deregulation ‘in the name of competitiveness’ (Marginson, 2015), their ER 
institutions remain much stronger than Liberal market capitalist countries. The 
same rationale applies to Nordic capitalist countries, in which trade unions remain 
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important with very high membership rates, while their competitiveness is 
considered as world leading. Finally, Southern European capitalist countries 
provide us with a cluster that exhibits high levels of collective bargaining 
centralization, but its competitiveness has been historically low. 
Firm competitiveness: Between institutions and practices 
Central to the neoliberal arguments is the premise that ER institutions hinder 
national ‘competitiveness’. Admittedly, competitiveness is a fuzzy concept. The 
World Economic Forum defines competitiveness very broadly as ‘the set of 
institutions, policies and factors that determine the level of productivity of a 
country’ (Schwab and Sala i Martin, 2013: 4). More helpfully, Porter (1990) 
suggests that competitiveness should reflect high productivity measured either at 
the national, sectoral or establishment-level. Indeed, establishment-level 
productivity has been one of the standard measures of firm competitiveness in the 
Human Resource Management (HRM) literature (Huselid, 1995). On the basis of 
the above, we examine firm competitiveness through the proxy of improved 
productivity at the establishment level.  
 
We unpack the relations between institutions, practices and productivity in more 
detail below. On the one hand, we draw on economic and employment relations 
literature to examine the relationship between ER institutions and productivity. 
On the other hand, we draw on the HPWS literature to deduce the relationship 
9 
 
between selected work practices (performance pay, training, and teamwork) and 
productivity. Schematically, the first group of testable hypotheses we set out 
below corresponds to the ‘low road’ to firm competitiveness, which is focused on 
increasing flexibility by deregulating employment relations institutions. The 
second group of hypotheses corresponds to the ‘high road’ to firm 
competitiveness, which is focused on investing in the abilities and motivation of 
the workforce. 
Employment relations institutions and productivity 
The neoliberal arguments are broadly premised on the model of the 
‘monopoly face’ of unions (Hayek, 1990). One version of the neoliberal argument 
distinguishes between centralised and decentralised bargaining. The argument 
goes that centralised bargaining may inhibit the flexibility of individual firms by 
placing a straightjacket on them and ignoring company-specific needs 
(Zagelmeyer, 2005). More specifically, it may hinder productivity-enhancing 
improvements in work organization through the universal standards that are 
imposed (Marginson, 2015: 111). Instead, decentralised bargaining is thought to 
be more responsive to companies’ needs. This monolithic conception misses the 
point that the institution of collective bargaining resembles a process, and its 
outcome is not pre-determined as it may take the form of either integrative 
(positive-sum) or distributive (zero-sum) bargaining.  
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A stronger version of this line of reasoning distinguishes between unionised 
and non-unionised workplaces, and suggests that the presence of unions in firms 
(i.e. irrespective of bargaining level) may hinder productivity. This reflects the 
typical neoclassical economics treatment of trade unions as vested interests, 
which exploit their bargaining power (e.g. due to skills/labour shortages) to 
extract ‘rents’ from employers (Borjas, 2005). Trade unions might therefore use 
their power to impose restrictive practices on output, and thus reduce 
productivity. One example might be the so-called ‘featherbedding’ practices, 
whereby the same number of tasks is shared across more union members. This 
thesis ignores the potential for alternative views in favour of ‘institutional voice’ 
effects (Freeman and Medoff, 1984). 
Finally, the same line of reasoning of ‘monopoly effects’ has been applied to 
works councils (Hirsch et al., 2010). Works councils and their consultation powers 
may be used in order to convince employers not to lay-off employees (Hirsch et 
al., 2010: 570–571). If works councils insist on the seniority principle (Last-In-
First-Out), then less productive employees might retain their jobs and thus, works 
councils might be seen as detrimental to productivity. Again, there are alternative 
arguments and evidence in favour of ‘institutional voice’ effects (Freeman and 
Medoff, 1984) for works councils as well. In sum, the above relationships lead to 
the formulation of the following hypotheses: 
H1: Higher levels of bargaining in European workplaces are negatively associated 
with productivity increases.  
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H2: The presence of trade unions in European workplaces is negatively associated 
with productivity increases.  
H3: The presence of works councils (or similar bodies) in European workplaces is 
negatively associated with productivity increases. 
 
Workplace practices and productivity 
A large body of literature looks into the work practices that contribute to high 
performance in organisations (Appelbaum et al., 2000; Huselid, 1995). Although 
the links between progressive human resources (HR) practices and firm 
performance resemble more of a ‘black box’, due to the various factors that 
mediate the relationship (Chowhan, 2016; Hefferman and Dundon, 2016; Jiang et 
al., 2013), it is largely acknowledged that ‘high road’ HR practices may be 
correlated with positive organisational outcomes. Hence, the HPWS literature 
suggests that certain work practices have positive effects on individual and group 
productivity, because they improve, among others, the organisational climate, 
motivation, employee empowerment, loyalty and commitment, and lower 
turnover rates, (Camps and Luna-Arocas, 2009; Shin and Konrad, 2014; Tregaskis 
et al., 2013). Although the ECS does not allow us to examine an extensive set of HR 
bundles, it does include information on three work practices that are usually 
linked to high-road HR bundles: PRP, teamwork and training.  
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To begin with, performance-related pay (PRP) is usually associated with 
increased productivity (Huselid, 1995). Although there is some debate in the 
literature, we follow those approaches that include performance-related pay as a 
core part of high performance work systems (Chowhan, 2016: 116; Hefferman and 
Dundon, 2016: 212; Posthuma et al., 2013: 1192). The effect of PRP on 
productivity may be direct or indirect. On the one hand, PRP is expected to 
increase employees’ productivity by altering their incentive structures and elicit 
more effort (Chowhan, 2016: 116). On the other hand, it may act indirectly by 
attracting a more capable workforce (Lazear, 2000). Either way the expected 
outcome is increased productivity. 
Second, we consider teamwork as being broadly a part of HPWS practices 
(Posthuma et al., 2013: 1192). There are several reasons why teamwork may 
enhance productivity; employees may work smarter because they combine 
different problem-solving skills or self-directed teams may be more efficient as 
some layers of supervision and middle-management are eliminated (Delarue et al., 
2008: 130). Another reason might be that employees may voluntarily work 
harder, because of peer-pressure norms (Tregaskis et al., 2013: 228). Overall, a 
meta-analysis on the effect of teamwork on organisational performance has 
concluded that teamwork is generally associated with enhanced organisational 
and individual outcomes, although their effects may be contingent on bundling 
with other practices (Delarue et al., 2008).  
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Finally, training is typically included as a part of the core HPWS practices 
(Appelbaum et al., 2000; Camps and Luna-Arocas, 2009: 1061; Huselid, 1995; 
Posthuma et al., 2013: 1192; Shin and Konrad, 2014: 11). Training may fill skills 
gaps or update skills through formal processes of training needs analyses. Thus, it 
may have a positive impact on the development of employee knowledge, skills and 
ability to perform in their jobs (Jiang et al., 2013: 1469). Another way to enhance 
productivity is through the development of problem-solving skills (Tregaskis et 
al., 2013: 227). Overall, this upgrading in human capital (or upskilling) is expected 
to have a positive impact on productivity. In sum, the above relationships lead to 
the formulation of the following hypotheses: 
H4: Performance-Related Pay (PRP) in European workplaces is positively associated 
with productivity increases. 
H5: Teamwork in European workplaces is positively associated with productivity 
increases. 
H6: Training in European workplaces is positively associated with productivity 
increases. 
Data, variables and methods 
To test the hypotheses specified above, we use data from the 2009 European 
Company Survey (ECS), a survey of approximately 27,000 establishments that 
took place between January and May 2009 across the whole EU-28 (plus FYROM 
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and Turkey). TNS Infratest Sozialforschung administered the survey, on behalf of 
the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions 
(Eurofound and TNS Infratest Sozialforschung, 2010) and the overview report 
was published on 30 May 2011 (Eurofound et al., 2011). 
By design, the universe for the survey only includes establishments with 10 
or more employees, while it excludes workplaces in Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fishing (NACE Rev. 1.1 A and B), Private Households (P) and Extraterritorial 
Organizations (Q). In our analysis, we focus our attention only to private sector 
workplaces in the EU-15 countries. Since the sampling method used leads to an 
over-representation of larger workplaces and those in smaller industries and 
countries in the final sample (Bryson et al., 2012), establishment weights that are 
provided with the dataset are used throughout our analysis. More technical details 
about the survey can be found in its Technical Report (Riedmann et al., 2009). 
In all establishments, an interview was conducted with a management 
representative responsible for personnel. This interview provides a wealth of 
information concerning workplace and workforce characteristics, collective 
bargaining and employee representation, HRM/work organization practices and 
subjective measures of workplace performance.  
Following the classification in the models of capitalism literature (Amable, 
2003; Becker, 2009) and the industrial relations regimes literature (Gumbrell-
McGormick and Hyman, 2013; Hyman, 2004), we categorize the EU-15 countries 
in four clusters: the Southern countries (Greece, Portugal, Italy and France)2, the 
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Continental countries (Austria, Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg, and the 
Netherlands), the Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland and Sweden); and the 
Liberal countries (Ireland and the UK). 
Dependent variable 
The dependent variable comes from the ‘Performance and Productivity 
Indicators’ section of the management questionnaire and the following question:  
‘And if you compare your establishment’s current labour productivity to the 
situation 3 years ago: Has it increased considerably, has it slightly increased, 
has it remained about the same or has it decreased since then?’ 
Using these answers, we create an ordinal variable for labour productivity 
changes that ranges from 0 (decreased) to 3 (increased considerably). 
Consequently, an ordered probit model is used for the examination of the 
productivity change variable. An alternative measure available in the survey asks 
the management representative to subjectively assess the relative labour 
productivity of the establishment compared with other establishments in the 
same sector. We judge that the survey respondents are more likely to be aware of 
changes in labour productivity that took place in the recent past in the 
establishment than about the establishment’s ranking in the sectoral productivity 
distribution. In other words, productivity change in the past three years is a better 
indicator of an informed managerial assessment of establishment performance. 
Moreover, the independent variables of interest to us (ER institutions and 
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practices) are variables that can be considered as relatively constant for long 
periods of time in the same establishment. Hence, any biases that arise due to the 
fact that the chosen productivity change measure is regressed on variables 
measured in the current period should be relatively small.  
We are also aware of the limitations of the use of subjective measures of 
workplace performance but, as Forth and McNabb (2008) and Bryson et al. (2006) 
argue, so is the case with objective performance indicators; for this reason, an 
analysis of both would be the most appropriate approach. Yet since objective, 
accounts-based, indicators are not available in the ECS, we proceed with this 
subjective measure of productivity change. Note that a preliminary examination 
showed that this measure is strongly correlated (and in the expected direction) 
with workplace outcomes also available in ECS that can be thought as 
intermediary ones (Forth and McNabb, 2008: 106), such as employee absenteeism 
and low motivation. This provides a further reassurance that we are indeed 
examining a meaningful measure of establishment productivity. 
Independent variables 
The bargaining level is measured using information from two questions. The 
management representative is first asked about the percentage of employees at 
the establishment that are covered by a collective wage agreement. If this is zero, 
the establishment is coded as having ‘no collective bargaining’. If it is greater than 
zero, a second question asks about the level at which the negotiations take place. 
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We distinguish between three kinds of establishments: those where bargaining 
takes place at the establishment or company level (decentralised), those with 
higher level bargaining (centralised), i.e. regional, sectoral or national, and those 
where both types of negotiations apply (two-tier).3  
Following Bryson et al. (2012) for the coding of the variables concerning 
employee representation, we focus on institutional or statutory forms of 
representation. Hence, we distinguish between trade union (TU) representation 
and works councils’ (WC) representation, based on the management responses 
about specific bodies that are available in each workplace and country (for the 
specific bodies in each country, see Bryson et al., 2012: 65–66). Dummy variables 
are then constructed for TU-only representation, WC-type-only representation 
and both types of representation available at the workplace (the reference 
category is the absence of any form of representation). 
To test our hypotheses concerning workplace practices, we code a dummy 
variable for the existence of performance related pay schemes in the workplace, 
while teamwork is measured by a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 in the 
workplaces where the management representative reported that work in teams is 
an important characteristic of the work organization in the establishment. Finally, 
for training incidence we code a dummy variable that indicates a positive answer 
to the question whether any of the employees have been given time off in the past 
12 months in order to undergo training.  
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However, the above independent variables of interest may be correlated 
with other observable workplace characteristics that determine establishment 
productivity changes. For this reason, we further control for a range of such 
characteristics, namely: establishment size (four dummies), industry (ten 
dummies based on the NACE Rev. 1.1 one-digit codes) whether the establishment 
is a branch of a company (and not a single independent organization), whether it 
is foreign owned, the proportion of female, of part-time, of highly skilled, and of 
fixed-term employees, the existence of a profit sharing scheme, a share ownership 
scheme, whether there is shift working patterns in the establishment, whether 
there are any employees regularly working at non-standard times/days (nights, 
Saturdays or Sundays), whether there was any work reorganization in the last 
three years (such as changes in the remuneration system, in the organization of 
the work process, in working time arrangements, or restructuring measures), and 
whether the organization was involved in any acquisition, takeover, merger, 
relocation or demerger in the last three years. These latter two variables can 
additionally deal to some extent with any biases that may arise because of the 
reference of the dependent variable to what happened in the past three years. 
Finally, country dummies that account for common unobserved country or 
institutional effects are also included in all our estimated models.4 
After dropping observations with missing values in any of the variables 
inserted in our model, we end up with a final sample of 10,048 observations across 
the EU-15. These are allocated across the different country groupings as follows: 
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3,216 in the Southern cluster, 3,462 in the Continental countries, 1,992 in the 
Nordic ones, and 1,378 in the Liberal countries.  
Results and discussion 
Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 reports the distribution of our dependent variable across EU-15, as 
well as separately for each country cluster. Most establishments, irrespective of 
country cluster, either report that productivity did not change during the past 
three years or that it increased slightly. However, significant numbers are also 
observed in the two extremes, and especially in the highest category of the 
dependent variable. On average, the best performing establishments are found in 
the Nordic countries (with 64% of establishments reporting an increase in 
productivity), whereas the worst performing ones are found either in the 
Southern or the Liberal cluster (with only around 50% of establishments in each 
group reporting a productivity increase in the past 3 years).  
[Table 1] 
To begin with, we look at the distribution of the independent variables of 
interest.5 Table 2 presents the relevant data. Some form of collective bargaining is 
quite widespread across the EU-15 private sector workplaces, the exception being 
the workplaces in the Liberal countries. On the other hand, most private sector 
workplaces (73%) in the EU-15 have no institutional or statutory recognized 
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employee representation, either in the form of a TU and/or a WC-type one. The 
exception to this pattern is the Nordic cluster, where TU-only representation is 
relatively very widespread. Finally, training and, especially, teamwork are quite 
prevalent across the EU-15 (with Liberal countries scoring the highest incidence 
rates), something that is not the case for performance related pay schemes. As a 
whole, the Southern countries record the (relatively) lowest prevalence of 
workplace practices.  
[Table 2] 
 
Regression results and discussion 
We now turn to the regression estimates. Table 3 reports the ordered 
probit coefficients (and associated standard errors) of the productivity change 
model.6 Two specifications are reported, both for EU-15 as a whole and for each 
country cluster: the first includes only the independent variables of interest (along 
with country dummies), while the second adds the further controls previously 
mentioned. While there are some slight differences between the results from the 
two specifications, most of them are quite robust to the inclusion of further control 
variables. In the discussion that follows, we refer to the second specification, 
which deals to a greater extent with the substantial heterogeneity observed across 
EU establishments. Moreover, since the ordered probit coefficients and its 
standard errors can only indicate the direction and significance of the effect of 
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independent variables, we will also refer in the text to some marginal effects of the 
variables of interest. The marginal effects show the (ceteris paribus) change in a 
probability relevant to the estimated model that results from changing an 
independent variable from the reference category to the category of interest and 
can, thus, provide some perspective on the size of the estimated associations. 
Throughout the paper, we focus on the probability of reporting the highest 
category in the productivity change variable (i.e. ‘increased considerably’) to 
estimate the marginal effects.7 
[Table 3] 
Across the whole EU-15 we find little support for Hypotheses 1-3. Starting 
from collective bargaining, Hypothesis 1 finds little support in the data. For EU-15 
as a whole, none of the bargaining level variables is estimated with a statistically 
significant coefficient, meaning that there is no difference between any of them 
and the reference category of no collective bargaining. However, the coefficient for 
decentralised (establishment or company) bargaining is significantly higher than 
the one for centralised (higher level) bargaining (p<0.01). The associated marginal 
effects though, do not show a very substantial difference: there is an 
approximately two percentage points (p.p.) increase in the probability of 
reporting the highest category of productivity change for the managers in 
establishments with decentralised bargaining relative to an establishment with no 
bargaining, while the marginal effect for the centralised bargaining variable shows 
a two p.p. decrease. Considering a 21% probability of belonging in the highest 
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category in EU-15 (see Table 1), these effects can be thought of as of limited 
substantive importance. 
When the models are estimated separately for each country cluster, we can 
observe some further interesting results. In the Southern cluster, we do not find 
any difference in productivity performance across establishments with different 
bargaining regimes. In the Nordic countries, establishments with decentralised 
bargaining seem to perform (very slightly) better than those with centralised 
bargaining, but none of them differs relative to the ‘no bargaining’ reference. A 
significantly negative (p<0.10; marginal effect -4.2 p.p.) association with 
centralised bargaining and productivity is observed only in the Continental 
countries. This finding appears puzzling given the trends towards derogation in 
collective agreements in Germany (Hassel, 2014) and elsewhere. Finally in the 
Liberal countries, establishments with decentralised bargaining seem to 
outperform both those with no collective bargaining and those where bargaining 
is conducted at higher levels. 
There is also a variation of results across different country clusters regarding 
employee representation, i.e. Hypotheses 2 and 3. First, establishments with TU-
only representation are significantly related with lower productivity change than 
comparable establishments with no representation in the EU-15. However, this 
result is only (marginally) significant, and also large in size, for the Continental 
countries. Considering that Austria, Germany and Luxembourg can only record 
WC-type representation in the data because of their particular industrial relations 
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systems, this result is probably driven by the rest of the countries in the group 
(Belgium and the Netherlands). 
Second, establishments with WC-type only representation seem to perform 
slightly better than other categories. This is particularly the case in the Nordic 
countries, where the associated marginal effect is 9.4 p.p., a particularly strong 
result. An exception to the overall pattern is the Southern cluster, where all 
representation variables coefficients obtain a negative sign. However, these 
coefficients are not statistically different from zero, meaning that in fact there is 
no difference between different types of employee representation and no 
representation in the European South. Finally, it should also be noted that no 
significant relationship could be found between the different types of 
representation in the Liberal countries. The apparent difference between the WC-
type only (or both types) coefficient and the TU-only one is not statistically 
significant at any conventional level of significance. 
Overall, there is little support for our Hypotheses 1-3 and, therefore, for 
conjectures suggesting union ‘monopoly effects’ (Freeman and Medoff, 1984; 
Hayek, 1990). The results on the whole suggest that there is no negative 
association between ER institutions and productivity change. Even in the Southern 
and Liberal institutional contexts, where unions are expected to be more conflict-
prone and adversarial, there is no negative relationship between unions and 
productivity. In Continental Europe unions appear to have some negative 
association with productivity, but this outcome appears also puzzling considering 
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the unprecedented levels of wage moderation in the previous decade in countries 
like Germany (Hassel, 2014); so, we suggest this might be driven by developments 
in Belgium and the Netherlands. 
Across the whole EU-15 Hypotheses 4-6 gain support. The marginal effects 
in Specification (2) in Table 3 for the whole EU-15 sample are 3.5 p.p. for PRP, 3.9 
p.p. for training incidence and 4.1 p.p. for teamwork (p<0.01 for all). This confirms 
by and large the expectation that work organization matters for productivity and 
competitiveness. As we discuss further below, this result suggests that policies 
that focus on decentralizing bargaining or limiting the power of unions at the 
workplace appear misplaced, whereas policies should focus on work practices 
that drive productivity improvements. 
When we shift our attention to country clusters, the picture suggests a more 
diversified effectiveness of those practices. PRP seems to matter for workplace 
productivity differences in the Southern countries and in the Liberal countries. 
The latter makes sense in light of the literature that suggests that variable pay is 
more aligned to shareholder value corporate governance (Hall and Soskice, 2001) 
and has been rather slow to penetrate market economies in Continental Europe. 
This finding for Southern Europe might be explained by the lack of any particular 
institutional complementarities in this model of capitalism (Amable, 2003). 
Training, on the other hand, is not a significant predictor of productivity 
anywhere outside the Southern cluster. This might appear puzzling, but if one 
looks carefully at the phrasing of the question, it focuses on time-off that 
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employees might get for training purposes. Thus, we could assume that training 
might be a built-in characteristic in the Continental and Nordic workplaces, e.g. 
on-the-job training through occupational labour markets (Streeck, 2005). Thus, 
time-off for training might matter in workplaces where embedded training is 
limited, as in Southern Europe. 
Finally, teamwork is positively and strongly related to productivity 
advantages only in the Nordic and the Southern countries. In Nordic countries, this 
seems to confirm conventional wisdom on the importance of teamwork in 
Swedish work organisation, despite critiques that it might have been exaggerated 
in the literature (Lorenz and Valeyre, 2005: 429). On the other hand, the 
importance of teamwork in Southern countries may be explained by the fact that 
any HPWS practice is likely to boost productivity in a context where institutional 
complementarities are absent. 
All in all, our results provide mixed evidence concerning the hypotheses 
posed in the previous section. First, the hypotheses proposing a negative 
association between ER institutions and firm competitiveness are not supported. 
It would be fair to claim that ER institutions (collective bargaining and employee 
representation) do not seem to have been behind productivity differences across 
EU-15 establishments in 2009. In other words, higher levels of regulation neither 
enhanced nor compromised establishment performance, the latter being proxied 
by subjectively assessed productivity changes. It seems, however, that in the 
Continental and the Liberal countries, establishments with lower levels of 
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bargaining fared somewhat better than similar ones with higher level bargaining. 
This finding raises some interesting questions regarding both the universality of 
the neo-liberal argument and the importance of the institutional setting in the 
potential success or failure of such policies.  
Our conclusion about the lack of evidence regarding the validity of the neo-
liberal argument can be strengthened even more if we note that unobserved 
differences in the dynamism of establishments might play a role in the results we 
obtain for the institutional variables. This is because more rapidly-growing 
industries, firms and establishments (that also experience higher productivity 
growth) may be associated with less ‘restrictive’ workplace practices, such as 
decentralized bargaining or no bargaining at all. In further checks we tried to 
account to some extent for this source of heterogeneity by additionally including 
in our models dummy variables indicating employment change (i.e. increase, 
decrease or stability) in the past three years. One can expect that rapidly growing 
firms will record both high levels of productivity growth and employment growth 
– although this is not a certainty, due to the complex relationships between the 
two variables. We do indeed find evidence that productivity change is strongly and 
positively related to employment change. However, these additional controls did 
not substantially affect the estimates of our independent variables of interest, 
hence our conclusions remain the same.  
Second, the hypotheses proposing a positive association between workplace 
practices and firm productivity are broadly supported for the EU-15 as a 
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homogenous sample. However, when we examine the same variables for different 
institutional contexts, it seems that some practices appear more related with 
productivity in particular models. Teamwork is particularly important for the 
Nordic cluster and PRP for the Liberal cluster, whereas any of the three work 
practices are important for the Southern cluster and none for the Continental. 
Conclusion 
It is a commonplace for neoliberal policies to blame ER institutions for having 
detrimental effects on competitiveness. However, the evidence-base for these 
claims is rather weak and inconclusive (ITUC, 2013). To shed further light on this 
debate, we set out to examine whether European workplaces with ER institutions 
were less able to improve productivity during the crisis. 
We relied on establishment-level evidence drawn from the European 
Company Survey 2009. The data were collected at a time that most European 
economies were in their deepest slump and shed light on the above relationships 
during the crisis. We built hypotheses drawing on relevant theories from political 
economy, industrial relations and HRM literatures. Empirically, our findings 
contribute to this debate by examining evidence from a pan-European 
establishment level survey. Conceptually, our article contributes to this debate by 
combining insights from the literature on micro-level work practices and the 
literature on macro-level institutional contexts. 
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Contrary to the dominant neoliberal discourse, our results suggested that ER 
institutions do not appear to have any significant negative effect on productivity 
increases across EU-15. Although there was no conclusive evidence showing a 
positive or negative relationship, these results cast additional doubt to the 
credence of neoliberal arguments, which are focused on dismantling ER 
institutions to improve competitiveness. We also considered the alternative 
hypotheses that ‘high road’ workplace practices (such as training, teamwork and 
PRP) are positively associated with productivity increases. These hypotheses 
were confirmed suggesting a strong and positive effect of selected work practices 
on productivity improvements. 
One of the limitations of this article is that we have hypothesized and tested 
only for a direct effect of institutions and practices on productivity change. Hence, 
we did not consider any ‘complementarities’ between practices and/or 
institutions, or the potential mediating role of ER institutions on the nature, 
adoption and effect of workplace practices. Such an exploration would require a 
different theoretical framework and empirical modelling strategy and, hence, was 
out of the scope of the present paper. Nonetheless, these should open up avenues 
for further research that is worth pursuing using comparative pan-European 
large-n survey data. 
Finally, our results have implications for both policy and practice. They 
suggest that the policies towards deregulating ER institutions appear misplaced, 
as there is no clear evidence to support a negative relationship between ER 
29 
 
institutions and productivity. The focus on institutions tends to downplay the role 
of other factors that matter for competitiveness, such as work organisation 
practices. Taken together, our results suggest that the continuation of the 
neoliberal ‘low road’ policies in the advanced industrialised countries of Europe is 
likely to have little effect in improving competitiveness. Instead, European 
countries and firms need to shift attention and resources towards the ‘high road’ 
to competitiveness, and improve productivity by enhancing work practices that 
overall motivate, enhance skills, and improve the effectiveness of the European 
workforce. 
 
Notes
1 EU-15 consists of the fifteen EU member states (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United 
Kingdom) prior to the accession of the ten candidate countries in May 2004. 
2 A coding mistake in the survey did not offer the option to managers in Spain to record trade union 
presence in their workplaces (Bryson et al., 2012: 31, fn. 21). Thus, to avoid the misclassification 
of Spanish establishments in the different employee representation categories we decided to 
exclude Spain from the analysis. 
3 The choice of bargaining level indicators is dictated by the way the relevant question is asked in 
the ECS: the respondents cannot distinguish among different types of higher level bargaining. 
Moreover, other, more qualitative, aspects of the practice of bargaining that may be thought to be 
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of relative importance, such as the degree of bargaining coordination within and between sectors 
and firms in different countries, is not available in the ECS.  
4  Modelling country-level heterogeneity with the inclusion of country dummies is the most 
appropriate choice when the interest lies in within-country variation, the number of countries is 
small, and there is no interest in and explicit modelling of country-level variables as predictors of 
the outcome of interest (see Bryan and Jenkins (2016) for a detailed discussion). As a robustness 
check though, we also estimated model specifications without country dummies. The results were 
very similar to the ones reported.  
5 Sample means for the rest of control variables are available from the authors on request. 
6 For ease of exposition only the results for the variables of interest are presented. Full results are 
available from the authors on request. 
7 For each marginal effect calculated, the rest of the variables are set at their sample means. 
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Table 1: Distribution of productivity change across EU-15 establishments  
 
 EU-15 Southern Continental Nordic Liberal 
Productivity in last 3 years      
Decreased 0.14 0.17 0.11 0.08 0.16 
About the same 0.33 0.32 0.34 0.27 0.34 
Increased slightly 0.33 0.26 0.38 0.44 0.31 
Increased considerably 0.21 0.25 0.18 0.20 0.19 
Observations (unweighted) 10,048 3,216 3,462 1,992 1,378 
 
Source: ECS 2009 and authors’ calculations.  
Notes: Numbers show the proportion of establishments giving each response for each country grouping; column 
proportions may not add to one due to rounding; weighted data.  
 
Table 2: Distribution of bargaining level, employee representation and workplace practices 
across EU-15 establishments 
 
 EU-15 Southern Continental Nordic Liberal 
Employment relations institutions      
Collective Bargaining      
No collective bargaining 0.31 0.18 0.27 0.16 0.65 
Decentralised bargaining  0.28 0.24 0.32 0.28 0.25 
Centralised bargaining  0.38 0.53 0.38 0.51 0.10 
Two-tier bargaining 0.03 0.06 0.03 0.05 0.01 
Employee Representation      
No employee representation 0.73 0.68 0.78 0.45 0.81 
WC-type representation only 0.15 0.14 0.19 0.03 0.12 
TU representation only 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.40 0.04 
Both types of representation 0.08 0.17 0.02 0.12 0.03 
Workplace Practices      
Performance related pay 0.36 0.30 0.41 0.42 0.37 
Training 0.64 0.50 0.70 0.57 0.75 
Teamwork 0.81 0.71 0.85 0.83 0.87 
Observations (unweighted) 10,048 3,216 3,462 1,992 1,378 
 
Source: ECS 2009 and authors’ calculations.  
Notes: Numbers show proportion of establishments for the relevant characteristic and country grouping; weighted data.  
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Table 3: Ordered probit estimates of productivity change models 
 
 (1) (2) 
 EU-15 Southern Continental Nordic Liberal EU-15 Southern Continental Nordic Liberal 
           
Bargaining Level (Ref: No bargaining) 
 
     
Decentralised 0.0802 0.0853 -0.0266 0.0479 0.2113** 0.0685 0.0207 -0.0171 0.0302 0.2230** 
 [0.0548] [0.1053] [0.0911] [0.1266] [0.1069] [0.0553] [0.1029] [0.0936] [0.1319] [0.1099] 
Centralised -0.0655 0.0043 -0.1994** -0.0805 -0.0584 -0.0838 -0.0331 -0.1712* -0.1054 -0.0377 
 [0.0522] [0.0890] [0.0882] [0.1150] [0.1267] [0.0536] [0.0903] [0.0928] [0.1227] [0.1364] 
Two-tier -0.0336 -0.0134 -0.0755 0.0941 -0.1512 -0.0560 -0.0639 -0.0005 0.0302 -0.0710 
 [0.0884] [0.1228] [0.1915] [0.1806] [0.2197] [0.0867] [0.1268] [0.1921] [0.1795] [0.2161] 
 
Employee Representation (Ref: No institutional employee representation) 
 
     
WC-type only 0.0783 -0.0518 0.1721** 0.3554** 0.1233 0.0115 -0.0607 0.1260 0.3075** 0.0701 
 [0.0539] [0.0922] [0.0802] [0.1504] [0.1339] [0.0574] [0.0945] [0.0961] [0.1460] [0.1357] 
TU only -0.1384* -0.1433 -0.3539* -0.0385 -0.1862 -0.1745** -0.2098 -0.3895* -0.0877 -0.2644 
 [0.0732] [0.2001] [0.2102] [0.0810] [0.1732] [0.0765] [0.2184] [0.2106] [0.0825] [0.1841] 
Both -0.0340 -0.1023 -0.0744 0.1731* 0.1617 -0.0899 -0.1188 -0.0778 0.0714 0.1017 
 [0.0651] [0.0773] [0.1355] [0.0884] [0.2716] [0.0723] [0.0893] [0.1506] [0.0985] [0.3129] 
 
Workplace Practices 
 
          
Performance related pay 0.1386*** 0.1478** 0.0930 0.0953 0.1902** 0.1253*** 0.1273* 0.0535 0.0335 0.2740*** 
 [0.0391] [0.0636] [0.0694] [0.0697] [0.0855] [0.0404] [0.0659] [0.0715] [0.0723] [0.0877] 
Training 0.1829*** 0.2201*** 0.1451* 0.1155* 0.1872* 0.1430*** 0.1742*** 0.1192 0.0841 0.1071 
 [0.0417] [0.0639] [0.0758] [0.0661] [0.1049] [0.0424] [0.0642] [0.0766] [0.0667] [0.1084] 
Teamwork 0.2036*** 0.2284*** 0.1723* 0.3271*** 0.1419 0.1523*** 0.1759** 0.1380 0.2543*** 0.0631 
 [0.0523] [0.0698] [0.1001] [0.0925] [0.1454] [0.0527] [0.0695] [0.1019] [0.0946] [0.1493] 
           
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Other controls No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 10,048 3,216 3,462 1,992 1,378 10,048 3,216 3,462 1,992 1,378 
 
Source: ECS 2009 and authors’ calculations.  
Notes: Weighted data; other controls described in text; robust standard errors in brackets; *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1.  
